Golden growth (FY2017–FY2019) → pandemic shock (FY2020–FY2021) → delivery boom and volatility (FY2022–FY2024) → consecutive losses and deleveraging (FY2025–FY2026). Revenue peaked at HK$10.2bn in FY2024; profit peaked at HK$1.71bn in FY2019 — the two peaks never coincided, which is the structural problem this report addresses.
黄金增长期（FY2017–FY2019）→ 疫情冲击（FY2020–FY2021）→ 交付大年与波动（FY2022–FY2024）→ 连续亏损与去杠杆（FY2025–FY2026）。营收峰值FY2024达102亿港元，盈利峰值FY2019达17.1亿——两个峰值从未同步出现，这正是本报告要解决的结构性问题。
| FYE 31 Mar财年（截至3/31） | Revenue (HK$100m)营收(亿) | Net Profit (HK$100m)归母净利(亿) | EPS (HK$)EPS(港元) | Gross Margin毛利率 | Net Margin净利率 | ROE | Gearing负债率 | DPS (HK cents)股息(港仙) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| FY2017 | 50.1 | 11.18 | 0.51 | 39.8% | 22.3% | — | — | — |
| FY2018 | 58.3 | 15.67 | 0.69 | 45.2% | 26.9% | — | — | — |
| FY2019 | 68.4 | 17.14 | 0.74 | 38.1% | 25.0% | — | — | — |
| FY2020 | 74.5 | 3.66 | 0.16 | 30.3% | 4.9% | 3.0% | 65.7% | — |
| FY2021 | 59.4 | 5.43 | 0.23 | 31.0% | 9.1% | 4.4% | 65.8% | 19.0 |
| FY2022 | 59.0 | 13.00 | 0.49 | 33.7% | 22.1% | 9.2% | 67.3% | 20.0 |
| FY2023 | 64.8 | 1.72 | 0.06 | 25.8% | 2.7% | 1.3% | 70.7% | 14.0 |
| FY2024 | 102.0 | 2.26 | 0.08 | 27.3% | 2.2% | 1.9% | 68.5% | 14.0 |
| FY2025 | 95.7 | −12.75 | −0.42 | 24.7% | −13.3% | −11.9% | 69.2% | 1.0 |
| FY2026 | 66.1 | −12.11 | −0.40 | 26.7% | −18.3% | −12.5% | 69.5% | 0 |
Notes: ROE and gearing for FY2017–FY2019 not disclosed in the retrieved data sources, marked "—". Gross margin computed as gross profit / revenue. FY2024 revenue surge (+57.5%) reflects concentrated completions in the UK, Singapore, Australia and Hong Kong; FY2026 revenue fell 31% on fewer completions while adjusted revenue (incl. JV attributable) fell only 6.5%. Sources: FEC annual reports, FY2026 results announcement (25 Jun 2026), westock / neodata; as of FYE 2026-03-31.注：FY2017–FY2019之ROE/负债率未在本次取数源中披露，标注"—"；毛利率按毛利/营收计算。FY2024营收激增（+57.5%）反映英国、新加坡、澳洲及香港项目集中竣工；FY2026营收因竣工减少下降31%，而经调整收益（含合营应占）仅降6.5%。来源：公司年报、FY2026业绩公告（2026-06-25）、westock / neodata，数据截至2026-03-31财年。
Revenue peaked in FY2024 while profit peaked five years earlier in FY2019. Property development revenue is recognized on completion, so P&L strength is a lagging, lumpy echo of past cycles — while costs, interest and impairments are current. This mismatch is why net margin collapsed from 27% (FY2018) to −18% (FY2026).
营收峰值出现在FY2024，盈利峰值却在五年前的FY2019。地产收入按竣工确认，损益表的强势是过去周期的滞后、脉冲式回声——而成本、利息与减值却是当期发生的。净利率从27%（FY2018）崩落至−18%（FY2026），根源正在于此。
The hotel segment (~21% of FY2025 revenue) is the Group's largest recurring-income base and has been expanding asset-light (Dorsett management contracts, Singapore/Malaysia acquisitions with partner capital). It is the template for how a second recurring business — aeroponic coffee — should be built.
酒店分部（约占FY2025营收21%）是集团最大经常性收入来源，且正以轻资产模式扩张（帝盛管理合同、携伙伴资本收购新加坡/马来西亚项目）。这正是第二项经常性业务——雾培咖啡——应当复制的模板。
Stripping fair-value noise, adjusted cash profit fell from HK$1.43bn (FY2022) to HK$266m (FY2025) and HK$109m (FY2026) — the underlying earnings engine is weakening faster than headline impairments suggest. Restoring it requires either a property upcycle or a genuinely new profit pool.
剔除公平值噪音后，经调整现金溢利从FY2022的14.25亿降至FY2025的2.66亿、FY2026的1.09亿港元——盈利引擎的弱化比表观减值所显示的更快。修复它，要么等待地产周期回暖，要么开辟真正的新利润池。